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INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
Pursuant to the Court's request dated September 13, 1989, defendant L.D.S. Social 
Services hereby submits its Supplemental Brief addressing the legislative and judicial 
approaches of other states to the equal protection and due process issues raised in this 
case. 
The request for additional briefing is surprising in view of the settled nature of the 
issues raised and the thorough analysis of those issues by both parties in their principal 
briefs. Plaintiffs argument that an unwed father whose relationship with a child is purely 
biological is entitled to a right of consent to adoption equal to that of the child's mother 
has been rejected by the United States Supreme Court and by this Court under both 
the state and federal constitutions. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 266-68 (1983); 
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 
(1978); Ellis v. Social Services Dept., 615 P.2d 1250, 1255 n.7 (Utah 1980) (citing both state 
and federal equal protection provisions); Wells v. Children's Aid Society, 681 P.2d 199, 204 
(Utah 1984). Plaintiffs argument that such an unwed father's paternal rights cannot be 
terminated without a fitness hearing has likewise been rejected by both courts under both 
the state and federal constitutions. See Lehr, supra, at 261-65; Quilloin, supra, at 254-55; 
Ellis, supra, at 1255-56; Wells, supra, at 204-08 (analyzing the issue under both state and 
federal due process provisions). These decisions have been followed and reaffirmed in 
recent cases. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989); Sanchez v. L.D.S. Social 
Services, 680 P.2d 753 (Utah 1984); In re Adoption of Baby Boy Doe, 111 P.2d 686 (Utah 
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1986). Accordingly, plaintiffs suggestion that the Court should now depart from, or 
overrule, these well settled and binding precedents is nothing short of a brash assault on 
the common law, whose guiding principle is stare decisis. 
In Hackford v. Utah Power & Light Co., 740 P.2d 1281 (Utah 1987), this Court 
was similarly faced with the question whether to overrule two "relatively recent" decisions 
denying a cause of action for loss of consortium. The appellant urged departure from the 
precedents as wrongly decided. However, the Court, in an opinion authored by Justice 
Zimmerman, responded, f,[W]e do not think that [the precedents] can be so easily 
ignored." Id. at 1283. The Court identified three factors in the determination whether 
to take the "rather unusual step" of departing from prior statutory interpretation: (1) the 
plausibility of the existing interpretation; (2) the degree to which that interpretation has 
worked itself into the state of the law; and (3) the strength of the arguments for changing 
that interpretation. Id. The Court traced the common law denial of the cause of action 
through the early statutory treatment to conclude that the existing case law interpretation 
was plausible. Secondly, the Court noted that while the interpretation had "become settled 
in the minds of the bench and bar," it was "not so enmeshed in the substance of the law 
that it could not easily be changed without having many unanticipated ramifications and 
without conflicting with real or presumed legislative intentions." Id. at 1285. However, 
the Court found no "persuasive policy reasons" to justify a change in the interpretation; 
in fact, there were more reasons against the change. Id. at 1286. Consequently, the Court 
refused to overrule the challenged precedents and concluded that any change in the law 
"should be done by the legislature." Id. at 1287. 
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The same rationale and conclusion apply in this case. First, it should be 
remembered that under the common law unwed fathers were accorded no legal rights to 
their offspring. This rule was codified in the very first statutes following Utah statehood, 
providing that an illegitimate child could be adopted with the consent of the mother alone. 
Rev. Stat. Utah § 4 (1898). Over the course of the next seventy-five years, this rule was 
followed as the law of Utah. See, e.g., Thomas v. Children's Aid Society, 12 Utah 2d 235, 
364 P.2d 1029, 1031 (1961) ("The putative father of an illegitimate child occupies no 
recognized paternal status at common law or under our statutes.") The case of Stanley 
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), properly altered the common law to recognize full parental 
rights in unwed fathers who have developed a substantial relationship with their children. 
Thereafter, the Utah Legislature amended the adoption statute to include the current 
registration and notice provisions whereby any unwed father may acquire full parental 
consent and due process rights by timely registering a claim of paternity. Laws of Utah, 
ch. 94 § 1 (1975). 
Given this long history of according different legal rights to unwed mothers than 
to purely biological unwed fathers, the statutory and constitutional construction of U.C.A. 
§78-30-4 in this Court's prior decisions is certainly "plausible." Moreover, that construction 
is not only "settled in the minds of the bench and bar," but, unlike the law in Hackford, 
is "so enmeshed in the substance of the law that it could not easily be changed without 
having many unanticipated ramifications and without conflicting with real or presumed 
legislative intentions." Hackford, supra (emp. added). A ruling now that section 78-30-4 
is unconstitutional would place in jeopardy literally hundreds of adoptions entered into in 
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reliance on this Court's prior decisions that the law is constitutionally sound. Moreover, 
the Legislature's intent is clear, and whether this Court agrees with the legislative approach 
or finds that the approach of other state legislatures may be preferable as a policy matter 
is irrelevant to the constitutionality of the statute. See Lehr, supra, at 264. Finally, 
plaintiff advances no arguments for changing the law that this Court has not previously 
rejected.1 Therefore, this Court should decline the invitation to overrule its prior decisions 
and leave any alteration of 78-30-4 to the Legislature. Hackford, supra. See also City of 
Seattle v. Buchanan, 90 Wash. 2d 584, 584 P.2d 918, 921 (1978) (constitution does not 
require statutes to keep pace with "shifting social standards").2 
In response to the Court's request for information on the "approaches to the 
problems taken by our sister states," defendants have undertaken an analysis of the law 
in all fifty states. The results of that study show that Utah is situated in the mainstream 
of American jurisdictions with regard to protection of parental rights of unwed fathers. 
(See Analysis of Unwed Fathers' Rights Pertaining to Adoption, Addendum.) 
A few observations and explanations concerning the data are necessary. First, 
there is no one or predominant model or approach to the problem. No two statutes are 
exactly alike. Each state addresses the problem from its own unique perspective, 
circumstances, and overall statutory framework. For example, two different statutes may 
Plaintiff attempts to raise for the first time in this Court the issue of gender discrimination under Article IV, 
Section 1 of the Utah Constitution. However, under settled rules of appellate review the issue was raised too late. See 
Resp. Br. p. 34 n.5, Reply Br. of Resp. pp. 1-2. In any event, the issue is merely a restatement of the equal protection 
claim. (See infra, p. 11.) 
The Social Services Interim Committee of the Utah House of Representatives recently passed a proposed bill, 
"Adoption Act Amendments," which would substantially alter section 78-30-4 and will be introduced in the 1990 General 
Session of the Legislature. 
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require consent to adoption from both "parents"; yet, one state code may elsewhere define 
"parent" to exclude unwed fathers. Those states purporting to adopt the Uniform 
Parentage Act each altered their version to conform with their own perceptions of fairness 
and their own balancing of the competing interests and public policies. In addition, 
statutes that facially treat the unwed mother and father alike may be judicially construed 
to provide disparate treatment under certain circumstances. Finally, while defendants have 
attempted to analyze the statutes in terms of the issues raised in this case, differences in 
terminology and complexity of required factual determinations precluded a definitive 
classification in some instances. 
The data are compiled under six column headings. The first column lists the state 
and its main statutory reference; however, there are typically other relevant statutory 
provisions too cumbersome to include in the chart. The second column notes whether the 
state treats unwed mothers and fathers substantially alike with regard to full consent and 
procedural rights, as argued for by the plaintiff. Only six states out of fifty fall into that 
category. The remaining states all accord unwed mothers full substantive and procedural 
rights while conditioning the unwed father's rights on his demonstrated relationship with, 
or interest in, the mother or the child. Generally, the stronger the relationship and 
interest demonstrated by the father, the more rights and protections he is accorded. 
Column three shows that twenty states require notice of the adoption to the father if he 
has resided with the mother for a substantial period of time or has provided significant 
financial support to the mother before, during, or after the pregnancy. Utah falls into this 
category by virtue of its common law marriage statute. U.C.A. § 30-1-4.5. Children born 
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to parties of a common law marriage are deemed legitimate for all purposes. U.C.A. § 
30-1-17.2. Column four shows that almost all states (including those that prescribe notice 
to all fathers) require notice of the adoption to fathers who have either developed a 
substantial relationship with the child, such as through living with the child for a substantial 
period of time or providing significant financial support for the child, or who have 
otherwise demonstrated their interest in, and legal commitment to, the child, such as 
through timely registration of paternity. At least twenty-seven states provide for 
registration of paternity as a means of demonstrating legal commitment to the child. Utah 
fits the column four category by virtue of its adoption by acknowledgment statute, U.C.A. 
§ 78-30-12, and the registration provision in 78-30-4. Column five shows the ultimate 
substantive right possessed by unwed fathers who have otherwise qualified for protection. 
Utah is one of eighteen states that accord qualified unwed fathers the ultimate substantive 
right-the power to veto the adoption without regard to the best interest of the child. 
Eighteen other states allow the unwed father only to present evidence relevant to the best 
interests of the child, and the remaining states vary the substantive right between best 
interests and veto according to the father's demonstrated interest and relationship. 
Column six requires separate attention. Here, defendants attempted to apply the 
facts of this case to each state statute to determine whether plaintiff would have received 
notice or a hearing under the law of other states. In some instances, the statute is 
modified by judicial construction. Utah is one of twenty states in which plaintiff, because 
of his disinterest and lack of commitment, would receive no notice or hearing prior to 
termination of his inchoate right. Eleven states would give him notice without regard to 
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registration, and in eleven other states he would receive notice solely because of a longer 
registration deadline. In the remaining states the outcome is uncertain because it depends 
on variables such as notice by publication.3 It is important to note, however, that in 
approximately ten of the states in which plaintiff would receive notice, his substantive right 
would be limited to presenting evidence on the child's best interests. Given the facts of 
this case, including the relative positions of plaintiff and the adoptive parents, the passage 
of time, and the bonding that has occurred, it is extremely unlikely that plaintiff would 
receive custody in those states. See, e.g., Adoption of Baby Doe, 492 So. 2d 508, 511 (La. 
App. 1986); and In re Catholic Child Care Society, 492 N.Y.S.2d 831, 834 (App. Div. 1985) 
(both upholding adoptions in the best interests of the child over objections of the unwed 
father). The bottom line is that in approximately only twelve states out of fifty would 
plaintiff have any realistic chance of gaining custody of the adopted child. 
It is evident, then, that Utah is not alone in its allocation of legal rights for unwed 
fathers. Utah stands with the majority of American jurisdictions which would reject 
plaintiffs claims and allow the adoption to proceed. More importantly, that result is 
correct under the facts of this case. Plaintiff had notice of all the facts previously 
determined by this Court to be necessary for the protection of his rights. He knew of the 
pregnancy; he knew the time and place of birth; and he knew of the possibility of 
adoption. Ellis, supra, at 1256; Wells, supra, at 207-08; Baby Boy Doe, supra, at 690-91. 
Moreover, while plaintiff is presumed to know the law, Sanchez, supra, at 755, the record 
Notice by publication would be required under some statutes because the mother in this case did not disclose 
plaintiffs identity to L.D.S. Social Services and expressly requested that he not be contacted. See Stipulated Facts, No. 
22, Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Services, 670 F. Supp. 1537, 1539 (D. Utah 1987). 
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in this case shows that he had actual knowledge of the registration requirement by having 
gone through the adoption of a previous illegitimate child. See Court of Appeals Opinion, 
slip op. at 15. Despite knowledge of these facts and requirements, plaintiff did nothing 
to demonstrate or protect his paternal interest. Construed in pari materia, then, U.C.A. 
§§ 78-30-4, 78-30-12, and 30-1-4.5 afforded plaintiff as much protection of his inchoate 
right as he would receive in the majority of other states in the country. See In re S.B.L., 
553 A.2d 1078, 1083 (Vt. 1988) (construing adoption and guardianship statutes in pari 
materia). 
To summarize, in view of the settled nature of the law on the issues raised, the 
favorable position of Utah law in relation to the law of other states, and the proper result 
in this case, the Court should either affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals or 
dismiss the case on the grounds that certiorari was improvidently granted. See Israel Pagan 
Estate v. Capitol Thrift and Loan, 111 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1989). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS OF ADOPTION CONSENT RIGHTS 
ACCORDED UNWED PARENTS IN OTHER STATES. 
As noted above, while all states accord unwed mothers full consent rights to the 
adoption of their children, all but a handful of states condition the unwed father's right 
of consent on some outward manifestation of relationship or interest. See Annot., 
"Necessity of Securing Consent of Parents of Illegitimate Child to Its Adoption," 51 A.L.R. 
2d 497 § 1 (1957 and Supp.) ("In general, in the case of illegitimate children, the statutes 
require the consent of the mother only."). The primary basis for this unequal treatment 
in the case of a newborn adoption is that unwed mothers and fathers are not similarly 
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situated with regard to the child. The mother, by reason of giving birth, automatically 
assumes legal custody and responsibility for the child, while the father may never come 
forward to share the responsibility. Perhaps the best statements of these realities are 
found in the dissenting opinions of Justices Stewart and Stevens in Caban, supra. {See 
Resp. Br. pp. 20-22.) Justice Stevens subsequently incorporated that same reasoning into 
his majority opinion in Lehr. See 463 U.S. at 259-60 n.16, 265-66. Courts of the various 
states have adopted or followed the same analysis in upholding laws that deny equal 
consent rights to the unwed father. 
For example, in In re Adoption of Baby Boy D, 742 P.2d 1059 (Okla. 1985), the 
court rejected the constitutional arguments of an unwed father who had developed no 
relationship with his adopted child. The court noted: 
The Constitution protects only parent-child relationships of biological 
parents who have actually committed themselves to their children and have 
exercised responsibility for rearing their children. [Id. at 1067.] 
The court upheld unequal consent rights, as follows: 
When men and women are not in fact similarly situated in the area covered 
by the legislation questioned, the Equal Protection Clause is not violated. . 
. . .Men and women are different, and the differences are relevant to 
the question whether the mother may be given the exclusive right to consent 
to the adoption of a child born out of wedlock. Because the adoption in this 
case, as in most adoptions, involves a newborn infant, it is appropriate to 
focus on the significance of the differences in such cases. From the point 
of conception on, the law recognizes the very real differences between the 
father and mother concerning the child's destiny. Only the mother has the 
constitutional right to decide whether to have the child or not have the child. 
The mother has the right to marry another male before the child is born 
and affect the "rights1' of the natural father who does not even have standing 
to dispute that the child is the child of the natural mother and her husband. 
At birth the mother is given custody of the child born out of wedlock. The 
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mother may choose to marry the natural father and positively affect his 
"rights". 
From conception through infancy the unwed mother will constantly be 
faced with decisions about how to best care for the child. It is much less 
certain that the unwed father will be faced with such problems. At the time 
and immediately after a child is born out of wedlock, the natural and real 
differences between the mother and father continue to justify some 
differential treatment of the mother and father in the adoption process. 
These differences justify a rule that gives the mother in whose sole charge 
the infant is often placed the maximum flexibility in deciding how to best 
care for the child. This is the rationale for a rule that gives the mother of 
the newborn child born out of wedlock the exclusive right to consent to its 
adoption. [Id. at 1068-69.] 
The court recognized that granting unwed fathers the same rights as all other parents, 
with no guarantee they would assume the responsibilities of a parent, would give the 
unwed father who is often a stranger to the child the right to prevent an adoption that 
is in the child's best interest, contrary to the mother's best judgment. In view of the 
competing interests of the mother and the child, equal protection does not require that 
the unwed father be given power to defeat those interests. Id. at 1069. 
Similarly, in In re Adoption of Emily Ann, 522 N.Y.S.2d 786, 788 (Fam. Ct. 1987), 
the court observed: 
[T]he United States Supreme Court has made it clear that when unwed 
fathers have manifested a significant paternal interest in the child, their 
consent to an adoption may be required. However, when such a father 
demonstrates no significant responsibility with respect to daily supervision, 
education, protection or care of the child, consent will not be required. A 
biological link without coming forward to assume parental responsibility is 
insufficient. [Citations omitted.] 
See also In re Adoption of Baby Boy L.y 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982) (distinguishing consent 
rights of married father from those of unwed father). 
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While it goes without saying, various courts have reaffirmed that an unwed father 
who has no right of consent to the adoption need not be accorded equal procedural rights 
either. See In re Adoption of S.J.B., 745 S.W.2d 606, 609 (Ark. 1988) ("the Equal 
Protection Clause does not entitle this father to notice of the adoption proceeding"); 
Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Services Bureau, 385 N.W.2d 448, 451 (Neb. 1986) (lack of 
notice to unwed father affirmed under strict scrutiny); In re Adoption of Baby Boy D, 
supra, at 1068 (statutory scheme did not require unwed father's consent "and, thereby, did 
not require that he have notice and an opportunity to be heard concerning the adoption 
of his child"). 
As noted previously, plaintiff now seeks to challenge section 78-30-4 under the 
equal rights provision of the Utah Constitution, Art. IV, Sec. 1. However, that provision 
does not prohibit all statutory distinctions between men and women. The Utah provision 
is not of recent vintage; it was included in the Constitution at statehood to protect the 
right of women's suffrage. Comment, "Equal Rights Provisions: The Experience Under 
State Constitutions," 65 Cal. L. Rev. 1086, 1092 (1977). Moreover, it has not been 
construed to require strict scrutiny of gender-based classifications. Distinctions based on 
"obvious and essential biological differences" have been traditionally upheld. Id. at 1088, 
1092-95, quoting Cox v. Cox, 532 P.2d 994, 996 (Utah 1975). For example, while a 
paternal preference for a child's surname or a maternal preference for child custody is 
impermissible as unrelated to any unique characteristic of the favored gender, see Hamby 
v. Jacobson, 769 P.2d 273 (Utah 1989); and Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986), a 
distinction based on pregnancy and child birth is permissible. 
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Courts and commentators throughout the country recognize that constitutional 
prohibitions against gender discrimination do not bar statutory distinctions based on real 
biological, physical, or functional differences between men and women. In one of the 
major works supporting a national Equal Rights Amendment, the authors candidly 
acknowledged that their call for absolute equality would not preclude all statutory 
distinctions: 
This principle, however, does not preclude legislation (or other official action) 
which regulates, takes into account or otherwise deals with a physical 
characteristic unique to one sex. In this situation it might be said that, in a 
certain sense, the individual obtains a benefit or is subject to a restriction 
because he or she belongs to one or the other sex. Thus a law relating to 
wet nurses would cover only women, and a law regulating the donation of 
sperm would restrict only men. Legislation of this kind does not, however, 
deny equal rights to the other sex. So long as the law deals only with a 
characteristic found in all (or some) women but no men, or in all (or some) 
men but no women, it does not ignore individual characteristics found in both 
sexes in favor of an average based on one sex. Hence such legislation does 
not, without more, violate the basic principle of the Equal Rights 
Amendment. 
Brown, 'The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for 
Women," 80 Yale L.J. 871, 893 (1971). Accordingly, discriminatory laws related to such 
matters as wet nurses, sperm donors, childbearing, and determination of fatherhood are 
permissible. Id. at 894. See also Comment, supra, at 1105-06; Michael M. v. Superior 
Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (upholding statutory rape law based on obvious physical 
differences in the sexes and the fact that only women could become pregnant); City of 
Seattle v. Buchanan, 90 Wash. 2d 584, 584 P.2d 918 (1978) (upholding law prohibiting 
exposure of female breasts); Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974) 
(prohibition of same-sex marriages permissible under state ERA); Holdman v. Olim, 581 
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P.2d 1164 (Haw. 1978) (law requiring female visitor to wear bra in male prison upheld 
under state ERA). 
Based on these same principles, other courts have upheld gender-based distinctions 
in adoption statutes. For example, in In re Baby Girl K, 113 Wis. 2d 429, 335 N.W.2d 846 
(1983), the court, in holding that equal protection does not require a finding of unfitness 
before an unwed father's rights can be terminated, reasoned: 
The statute here is based upon a recognition that for women biology dictates 
that they provide care and support for a child during pregnancy. For men 
however, that care and support must be voluntarily given. Men may or may 
not accept and exercise significant responsibility for the care and protection 
of the child during pregnancy; women have it thrust upon them. [Id. at 857.] 
See also In re "A", 735 S.W.2d 232, 238-39 (Tenn. App. 1987) (statute denying unwed 
father rights equal to mother's "does not create a gender-based classification," but rather 
discriminates on basis of legal relationship with child). 
In summary, the great majority of other states uphold the statutory distinction 
between the legal rights of unwed mothers and fathers as consistent with the natural 
differences between the parents and their relation to the child and as necessary to achieve 
the compelling purposes of the statute.4 
This Court upheld the constitutionality of section 78-30-4 under a strict scrutiny analysis in Wells, supra, 681 P.2d 
at 206. The Court held that "the state has a compelling interest in speedily identifying those persons who will assume a 
parental role over newborn illegitimate children, " id., and concluded: 
Section 78-30-4(3) is narrowly tailored to achieve the purposes identified above. No infringement 
of the unwed father's rights not essential to the statute's purposes has been identified. [Id. at 207.] 
This analysis has been described by the country's foremost family law expert as "well-reasoned." H. Clark, The Law of 
Domestic Relations in the United States, Student Edition p. 861 (2d ed. 1988). Surely, then, what passed strict scrutiny 
under due process in 1984 passes the same analysis under equal protection in 1989. 
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POINT II: DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS OF ADOPTION RIGHTS ACCORDED 
UNWED PARENTS IN OTHER STATES. 
The great majority of states follow the analysis in Lehr that an unwed father is 
accorded due process rights in direct proportion to the parental responsibilities he has 
assumed. 463 U.S. at 257. Only 'f[w]hen an unwed father demonstrates a full 
commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood" does his parental right "acquire[] 
substantial protection under the Due Process Clause." Id. at 261. Until that time his 
interest remains "inchoate" and the state is required to protect only "his opportunity to 
form such a [parental] relationship." Id. at 263, 265. For example, in In re Baby Girl 
Eason, 257 Ga. 292, 358 S.E.2d 459, 462 (1987), the court acknowledged that this 
"opportunity interest" may be lost by failure timely to register paternity, as it was in Lehr. 
In In re Petition of Steve B.D., 112 Idaho 22, 730 P.2d 942 (1986), the unwed father lost 
his right to prevent the adoption of his child, relinquished without his knowledge two days 
after birth, because he failed to establish a relationship or timely register his paternity. 
And in In re Adoption of a Child of Indian Heritage, 111 N.J. 155, 543 A.2d 925, 936, 942 
(1988), the unwed father lost his inchoate right through indifference, delay, and failure to 
register his paternity, resulting in prejudice to the adoptive parents. 
In view of the limited and tenuous nature of an unwed father's opportunity interest, 
the due process inquiry is limited to whether the state law adequately protects that 
interest. In B.G. v. H.S., 509 N.E.2d 214 (Ind. App. 1987), the unwed mother 
relinquished the child for adoption shortly after birth without notice to the unwed father, 
despite having previously received from him a written acknowledgment of paternity and 
offer of support. The court held that the law entitling him to notice only if he timely filed 
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a paternity action adequately protected his interest. Likening the requirement to the 
registration scheme upheld in Lehr, the court observed: 
The New York statute upheld in Lehr required only that such men mail a 
postcard to the state's putative father registry indicating an intent to claim 
paternity, either before or after the birth of the child. Requiring unwed 
fathers to initiate a paternity action in order to ensure that they receive 
notice of adoption proceedings certainly places a greater burden upon them 
than requiring that they mail a postcard, yet we cannot say that it is an 
onerous burden. What is at stake is an unwed father's opportunity to 
develop a full parent-child relationship, with its attending financial and other 
responsibilities. It is not unreasonable to require that in order to protect this 
opportunity, an unwed father be required to take a step toward establishing 
such a relationship and toward accepting such responsibilities. 
. . .Due process does not require that every possible biological father 
be given notice of adoption proceedings-only that the notice scheme not 
omit many responsible fathers. [Id. at 216-17.] 
Citing the mother's privacy interest in not notifying the father, and concluding that not 
many responsible fathers would be omitted, the court upheld the statute and the adoption. 
Id. at 217. 
Similarly, in Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Services Bureau, 222 Neb. 574, 385 N.W.2d 
448 (Neb. 1986), the statute required an unwed father to register his paternity within five 
days after birth of the child in order to protect his rights. The father, who registered his 
paternity four days late, challenged the constitutionality of the statute. The court upheld 
the statute as necessary for prompt placement of out-of-wedlock children: 
An unwed mother would then know at the time she is likely to be released 
from the hospital whether the father will step forward, claim his own flesh 
and blood, and assume the responsibilities he biologically created. If not, the 
mother may then make the painful decision alone and not be left in the 
terrible limbo of growing attachment and love for the child, awaiting either 
the outcome of a judicial proceeding with its attendant notoriety or the 
decision of the amorous Hamlet in the wings, pondering whether he should 
assume his responsibility. 
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It is further obvious that the Legislature exercised a judgment favoring 
adoption of children of unwed couples as soon as possible after birth, 
concluding that the placement of the child in a home with persons anxious 
to have, love, and rear the child is to be preferred over a battleground where 
the mother must either depend on social agency support or on the outcome 
of a judicial support proceeding to compel the father to assume his 
responsibility. [Id. at 452.] 
The court observed that a fixed deadline by which a father must assert his rights is also 
essential to attracting potential adoptive parents, as it is "questionable" whether any "would 
assume custody of a newborn with the prospect of later having to surrender the child." 
Many other courts have held that an unwed father who fails timely to demonstrate 
his paternal commitment in the manner prescribed by law is not entitled to notice of the 
adoption. For example, in In re Adoption of SJ.B., 745 S.W.2d 606 (Ark. 1988), a child 
was born "as a result of an isolated sexual encounter," and the mother refused to notify 
or identify the father "for reasons of religion and privacy." Id. at 607. The trial court 
held that the adoption could not proceed without notice to the biological father, but the 
state supreme court reversed, stating: 
In the present case the putative father did not avail himself of this [statutory] 
procedure, nor did he take any affirmative action concerning his paternity or 
inquire about the possibility of his fatherhood. We therefore conclude that 
an unmarried father lacking any substantial relationship with his child is not 
entitled to notice of the child's adoption proceeding under either the Due 
Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. [Id. at 609.] 
Similarly, in In re Karen A.B., 513 A.2d 770 (Del. 1986), the unwed father had no 
knowledge of the pregnancy or of his child's birth, and the unwed mother "refused to 
name the father for fear he will return and harass her and her family if he is told of [the 
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child's] existence." Id. at 771. The court held that notice to the father was not 
constitutionally required: 
While there is minimal information in the record concerning the father's 
disposition and employment status, and little concerning the petitioner's own 
attempts to identify and locate him, the record suggests that he would not 
be able to adequately care for the child and would not want to do so. Most 
importantly, should we refuse to terminate his rights, Karen would face the 
possibility of perpetual foster care, a result that we cannot sanction. 
Moreover, we are conscious of the mother's privacy interest in being free 
from harassment by Karen's father. 
As for whether the father has a due process right to notice of the 
termination proceedings, we now find after reargument in this case that he 
does not. [Id. at 772.] 
See also In re Adoption of Baby Girl Desmarais, 84 Or. App. 257, 733 P.2d 922 (1987) 
(upholding adoption without notice to unwed father who had filed paternity action in 
neighboring state). 
Some states require notice by publication to unwed fathers whose identity or 
location is unknown; however, several courts have acknowledged the futility and negative 
effects of the requirement. For example, in In re Adoption ofN, 66 Or. App. 66, 673 P.2d 
864 (1983), the court reversed a lower court's order requiring notice by publication to the 
unwed father, whom the mother had been with only once: 
A stringent requirement for notification in every case could also impinge 
on the important goal of keeping adoption proceedings anonymous. If, as 
here, the whereabouts of the putative father are unknown, the only effective 
means of notification is by publication. A publication could embarrass the 
mother, the putative father and the child. [The statute] provides that notice 
by publication need not name the mother. Without naming the mother, 
however, notice by publication will be an exercise in futility in many cases, 
serving only to delay an adoption. A publication naming the mother may 
also affect her constitutional right to privacy. [Id. at 868, citations omitted.] 
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See also Catholic Charities v. Zalesky, 232 N.W.2d 539, 546-49 (Iowa 1975) (extensive 
analysis authorizing adoption courts to dispense with notice to unwed fathers in certain 
circumstances). Notice by publication can be especially damaging where the unwed 
parents each have families of their own that would be jeopardized by the announcement 
to friends and neighbors of the illegitimate birth. See Augusta County Dept. of Soc. 
Services v. Unnamed Mother, 348 S.E.2d 26 (Va. App. 1986). In those cases where 
publication notice does not reach the targeted father, the adoption is permitted to proceed 
anyway, and the damage caused by months of delay goes for naught See In re J.F., 719 
S.W.2d 790 (Mo. 1986) (child and adoptive parents "should not remain in limbo11); In re 
Adoption of Baby Boy D, supra, 742 P.2d at 1064-66 (differences in availability of unwed 
parents justifies distinct procedural rights). 
Courts in other states have also rejected the argument made in this case that an 
unwed father's opportunity interest cannot be terminated without a hearing and showing 
of unfitness. For example, in In re Adoption of Mullenix, 359 So. 2d 65 (Fla. App. 1978), 
the unwed father had notice of the adoption but alleged denial of "substantive due process 
by the termination of his parental rights in the absence of proof of unfitness.11 Id. at 67. 
The court held that because the unwed father's right was not perfected, as in the case of 
the mother or a married father, it could be terminated on the basis of the child's best 
interests. Id. at 68. Likewise, in In re Baby Girl K, 113 Wis. 2d 429, 335 N.W.2d 846 
(1983), the court held that the father's failure to establish a relationship with his child 
eliminated the requirement for a showing of unfitness, despite the fact that the father had 
been in prison since the fifth month of the mother's pregnancy. Id. at 851, 853. The 
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court reasoned that the father could have established such a relationship by rendering care 
and support to the mother during the pregnancy; instead, like Swayne in the present case, 
he manifested indifference by suggesting that "she and the child go live with his mother 
after the baby was born." Id. at 848; see pp. 852, 855. See also In re Adoption of Joseph 
LLy 470 N.Y.S.2d 784, 786-87 (App. Div. 1983), afpd, 63 N.Y.2d 1014, 473 N.E.2d 736 
(1984) (upholding presumption of unfitness on grounds that mere biological relationship 
is not entitled to full constitutional protection); In re "A\ 735 S.W.2d 232, 238 (Tenn. App. 
1987) (by having cohabited without benefit of marriage, father "assumed risk of loss of the 
legal benefits of marriage"); In re Adoption ofRG.C, 742 P.2d 471, 474 (Mont. 1987) ("A 
statute should not be interpreted in favor of a father who seeks the benefit of parental 
rights but shuns the burden of parental obligations."). 
In summary, an unwed father who has developed no substantial relationship with 
his child is not constitutionally entitled to notice or a fitness hearing before the child may 
be adopted and his inchoate right terminated. U.C.A. § 78-30-4, construed in pari materia 
with 30-1-4.5 and 78-30-12, gives full due process protection to fathers who develop a 
substantial relationship either before or after the birth, or who register their paternity 
prior to the relinquishment or petition for adoption. The only fathers excluded from 
protection are those, like plaintiff, who manifest indifference to the mother and child and 
who fail to take timely action to protect their opportunity interest. Certainly, this statutory 
scheme is not likely "to omit many responsible fathers," see Lehr, supra, at 264, and has 
not omitted such a father in this case. While some other states may accord broader 
notice or allow a longer registration deadline, those features are not constitutionally 
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required; rather, they represent merely differences in legislative policymaking and 
linedrawing. Moreover, as noted by several courts, such provisions "merely complicate the 
adoption process, threaten the privacy interests of unwed mothers, create the risk of 
unnecessary controversy, and impair the desired finality of adoption decrees." Id. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should either affirm the Court of Appeals 
decision on the constitutional issues or dismiss the case on the grounds that certiorari was 
improvidently granted. 
DATED this 13th day of October, 1989. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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ADDENDUM 
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ANALYSIS OF UNWED FATHERS' RIGHTS PERTAINING TO ADOPTION 
(1) 
State/ 
Statute 
(2) 
Consent 
and/or Notice 
Rights Equal 
to Mothers 
(3) 
Notice 
Because of 
Relationship 
With Mother 
(4) 
Notice Because of 
Interest in or 
Relationship 
With Child 
(5) 
Substantive 
Right of 
Father (Best 
Interest/Veto) 
(6) 
Whether Swayne 
Would Have 
Received Notice 
or Hearing 
Alabama 
26-10-3 
Alaska 
25.23.040 
Arizona 
8-106 
Arkansas 
9-9-206 
California 
224:7004 
Colorado 
19-6-126 
Connecticut 
45-61d 
Delaware 
13 § 908 
Florida 
63.062 
Georgia 
19-8-4.-7 
Hawaii 
578-2 
Idaho 
16-1513 
Illinois 
9.1-8 
Indiana 
31-3-1-6.-6.1 
Iowa 
600.7. .11 
Kansas 
38-1129 
Kentucky 
199.500. .607 
Louisiana 
9:422.14 
Maine 
19 § 532 
Maryland 
5-310 to -312 
Massachusetts 
210 §§ 2. 4A 
Michigan 
710.31 
Minnesota 
259.24.-26 
Mississippi 
93-17-5 
Missouri 
453.040. .060 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
N/A 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
N/A 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
N/A 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes (R) 
N/A 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes (R) 
Yes (R) 
N/A 
Yes (R) 
Yes 
Yes (R) 
Yes (R) 
N/A 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes (R) 
Yes 
Yes (R) 
Yes (R) 
Yes (R) 
Yes (R) 
No 
Yes 
BI 
Veto 
Veto 
Veto 
Veto/BI 
BI 
Veto 
Veto 
Veto 
Veto 
Veto/BI 
BI 
Veto 
Uncertain 
BI 
BI 
Uncertain 
BI 
Veto 
BI 
BI 
BI 
Veto 
Uncertain 
Veto 
No 
Yes (D) 
Yes 
No 
Uncertain 
No 
Yes (D) 
No 
No 
No 
Yes (D) 
Yes 
Uncertain 
No 
No 
Yes 
Uncertain 
No 
No 
Yes (D) 
Yes (D) 
Yes 
Yes (D) 
No 
No 
(R) - Denotes states with unwed father registry. 
(D) - Denotes notice or hearing because of longer registration deadline. 
A N A L Y S I S O F UNWED FATHERS* R I G H T S PERTAINING T O A D O P T I O N (CONTINUED) 
(1) 
State/ 
Statute 
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Consent Notice Notice Because of Substantive Whether Swayne 
and/or Notice Because of Interest in or Right of Would Have 
Rights Equal Relationship Relationship Father (Best Received Notice 
to Mother's With Mother With Child Interest/Veto) or Hearing 
Montana 
40-6-125 
Nebraska 
43-104 
Nevada 
127.040 
New Hampshire 
17Q-B-.5. 5-a 
New Jersey 
9:3-45. 17-43 
New Mexico 
40-7-35 
New York 
111. 111-a 
North Carolina 
48-6 
North Dakota 
14-15-05 
Ohio 
3107.06 
Oklahoma 
10 §§ 60.6. .7 
Oregon 
109.092. .096 
Pennsylvania 
23 §§ 2503. 2711 
Rhode Island 
15-7-5. 15-8-3 
South Carolina 
20-7-1690. -1734 
South Dakota 
25-6-1.1 
Tennessee 
36-1-111 
Texas 
13.21 
Utah 
78-30-4. -12 
Vermont 
15 §§ 435. 441 
Virginia 
63.1-225 
Washington 
26.33.110. .160 
West Virginia 
48-4-3. -8 
Wisconsin 
§§ 48.415. 259.26 
Wyoming 
1-22-108, -110 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
N/A 
Yes 
N/A 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
N/A 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes (R) 
Yes (R) 
N/A 
Yes (R) 
Yes (R) 
Yes 
Yes (R) 
Yes (R) 
Yes (R) 
Yes (R) 
Yes (R) 
Yes (R) 
Yes (R) 
Yes (R) 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes (R) 
Yes (R) 
Yes (R) 
Yes 
Yes 
N/A 
Yes 
Yes (R) 
Yes 
BI 
BI 
Veto 
Veto/BI 
Uncertain 
Veto/BI 
Veto/BI 
Veto 
Veto 
Veto 
Veto/BI 
Veto/BI 
Veto 
Veto/BI 
BI 
Uncertain 
BI 
BI 
Veto 
BI 
BI 
Veto 
Uncertain 
BI 
BI 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes (D) 
Uncertain 
Uncertain 
Yes (D) 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes (D) 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes (D) 
Uncertain 
No 
No 
Uncertain 
Yes 
Uncertain 
Yes (D) 
No 
(R) - Denotes states with unwed father registry. 
(D) - Denotes notice or hearing because of longer registration deadline. 
